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ABSTRACT
Objectives Respiratory infectious disease outbreaks pose 
a threat for loss of life, economic instability and social 
disruption. We conducted a systematic review of published 
econometric analyses to assess the direct and indirect 
costs of infectious respiratory disease outbreaks that 
occurred between 2003 and 2019.
Setting Respiratory infectious disease outbreaks or 
public health preparedness measures or interventions 
responding to respiratory outbreaks in OECD countries 
(excluding South Korea and Japan) so as to assess studies 
relevant to the European context. The cost- effectiveness 
of interventions was assessed through a dominance 
ranking matrix approach. All cost data were adjusted to the 
2017 Euro, with interventions compared with the null. We 
included data from 17 econometric studies.
Primary and secondary outcome measures Direct 
and indirect costs for disease and preparedness and/or 
response or cost- benefit and cost- utility were measured.
Results Overall, the economic burden of infectious 
respiratory disease outbreaks was found to be significant 
to healthcare systems and society. Indirect costs 
were greater than direct costs mainly due to losses of 
productivity. With regard to non- pharmaceutical strategies, 
prehospitalisation screening and the use of protective 
masks were identified as both an effective strategy and 
cost- saving. Community contact reduction was effective 
but had ambiguous results for cost saving. School closure 
was an effective measure, but not cost- saving in the long 
term. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis was the most cost- 
saving and effective pharmaceutical intervention.
Conclusions Our cost analysis results provide evidence to 
policymakers on the cost- effectiveness of pharmaceutical 
and non- pharmaceutical intervention strategies which may 
be applied to mitigate or respond to infectious respiratory 
disease outbreaks.
INTRODUCTION
Emerging, re- emerging and endemic respi-
ratory and influenza- like infectious diseases 
represent a threat for loss of life, economic 
instability and social disruption as they can 
rapidly spread within communities and across 
countries, affecting the whole globe. Annually, 
it is estimated that 5%–15% of the population 
will suffer from influenza- related respiratory 
tract infections, while 3–5 million people face 
severe illness due to influenza.1 In 2018, a 
total number of 109.5 million influenza virus 
episodes were identified among children 
under 5 years globally, with approximately 
34 800 overall deaths. In Europe, seasonal 
influenza is estimated to lead to 4–50 million 
symptomatic cases and 15 000–70 000 deaths 
annually; however, this may differ between 
years, as the severe 2017/2018 influenza 
season led to an estimated 152 000 deaths in 
Europe alone.2 3
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► A systematic approach was followed, and the as-
sessment of data quality indicated that the majority 
of studies included were of high quality.
 ► The synthesis of the results was performed using the 
dominance ranking matrix approach, which allowed 
for a direct comparison of the cost- effectiveness of 
each intervention to the null.
 ► Costs and resources varied between different 
countries, different regional settings and over time, 
making the cost component comparison of cost- 
effectiveness measures complex to interpret.
 ► We only focused on EU and OECD analogous coun-
tries excluding Japan and South Korea, and hence 
our cost- effectiveness analyses are not applicable 
to other countries or settings.
 ► Discrepancies in context and populations likely affect 
the implementation and efficacy of interventions.
 ► This study was conducted prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
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pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm


















pen: first published as 10.1136/bm





2 Vardavas C, et al. BMJ Open 2021;11:e045113. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045113
Open access 
In order for robust national preparedness systems and 
response strategies to outbreaks to be established in the 
Europe, it is crucial for public health officers to receive 
recent data of the health impact and the economic 
burden of respiratory infectious disease outbreaks in 
contrast to emergency response and preparedness 
actions. This evidence will ensure well- informed deci-
sions regarding, among others, the proper allocation of 
resources.4 5 To this extent, although there is substantial 
literature from previously published systematic reviews on 
the value of public health emergency preparedness, they 
either refer to an older timeframe6 or use mathematical 
models to predict the effectiveness and cost- effectiveness 
of measures.7 Hence, there is limited recent information 
on the economic evaluations of infectious respiratory 
disease outbreaks that provide an overview of the cost 
effectiveness of response measures.8
Within the above context, the aim of this systematic 
review of econometric analyses was to assess the economic 
impact of response and preparedness measures when 
contrasted with the cost of infectious respiratory disease 
outbreaks. We further synthesise the cost- effectiveness 
for each intervention using a dominance ranking matrix 
(DRM) approach.
METHODS
Search strategy and selection criteria
A comprehensive systematic literature review of published 
econometric analyses was conducted between July and 
August 2019 using the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta- analyses (PRISMA) guide-
lines9 and the Consolidated Health Economic Eval-
uation Reporting Standards (CHEERS)10 to identify 
peer- reviewed articles using two biomedical literature 
databases (PUBMED and EMBASE) and two economic 
literature databases (ECONLIT, IDEAS REPEC). The 
search strategy was designed for a broader study aiming 
to identify econometric studies on all types of infectious 
diseases, but due to the outbreak of COVID-19, and for 
the purposes of this specific article, we retained only those 
referring to respiratory infectious diseases. The complete 
search strategy and search terms are available in online 
supplemental appendix 1.
The inclusion criteria were as follows:
 ► Exposure: respiratory infectious disease outbreaks or 
public health preparedness measures or interventions 
responding to respiratory outbreaks in OECD coun-
tries (excluding Asian countries South Korea and 
Japan due to the wide cultural differences with the EU 
context as this study was performed under contract 
for the European Center for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC)).
 ► Comparator: (i) no intervention (cost of inaction) or 
current practice, (ii) cost of preparedness versus cost 
of response (for studies reporting cost and benefit of 
public health preparedness).
 ► Outcome measures: direct and indirect costs for 
disease and preparedness and/or response or cost- 
benefit and cost- utility. Typical outcome measures of 
economic evaluations included: life years gained or 
cost per life- year gained with the intervention under 
investigation when incremental costs are combined, 
cost per quality- adjusted life year (QALY) gained, 
cases averted, monetary outcomes.
 ► Perspective: all direct and indirect costs pertaining 
to all relevant perspectives (eg, individual, hospital, 
insurance and societal—including national and 
regional) and all direct and indirect costs pertaining 
to all relevant perspectives according to York Health 
Economics Consortium11 (health system perspec-
tive, including hospital, public health units; societal 
perspective; governmental perspective).
 ► Study designs: all relevant analytical epidemiological 
designs which estimate cost either as full economic 
evaluation studies, including cost- minimisation, cost- 
effectiveness, cost- utility and cost- benefit studies; cost- 
outcome and economic modelling studies or partial 
economic evaluations.
 ► Timeframe: from 2003 until August 2019, to reflect 
the timepoint from the 2003 SARS outbreak and 
onward12—this review refers to the pre- COVID-19 
published evidence.
Studies that met the above inclusion criteria but did 
not report or perform any econometric analysis were 
excluded.
Data analysis and extraction
Studies identified from the searches were uploaded into 
a bibliographic database in which duplicate entries were 
removed. Initially, a pilot training screening process 
was used, where a random sample of 100 titles and 
abstracts were screened independently for eligibility by 
four reviewers (KN, KZ, RP, JLB) to enable consistency 
in screening and identify areas for amendments in the 
inclusion criteria. Following this, a random sample of 
50% of titles and abstracts was screened independently 
by two reviewers. Since a high measure of inter- rater 
agreement was achieved (percentage agreement >88.7% 
and/or Cohen’s Kappa >0.646), the remaining titles and 
abstracts were screened for eligibility by one reviewer. 
Where insufficient information was available in the title 
and abstract to make a decision, the full- text article of 
the document was retrieved for further inspection. 
Full- text documents of potentially eligible studies were 
retrieved for the records marked for inclusion. All full- 
text documents were independently double- screened 
by two reviewers, and inter- rater agreement measures 
were calculated at 88.3%. Disagreements in every step of 
the process were subsequently discussed and agreed on. 
Documents that passed the inclusion criteria on the basis 
of the full- text screening were included in the current 
review.
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Appraisal of methodological quality
For evaluating the methodological quality of the included 
studies, the Consensus on Health Economic Criteria 
(CHEC) checklist13 was used. This specific tool has been 
designed for the assessment of full economic evaluations 
and includes 19 items (questions) with answers of ‘Yes’ 
or ‘No’. For each positive answer on full economic eval-
uation studies, a single point was being assigned for the 
methodological quality, with a maximum score of 19. For 
the quality appraisal of partial economic evaluations, 
we used items from the CHEC checklist that were appli-
cable—hence, the maximum score was 16. The quality 
appraisal process was completed by two reviewers, with 
a percentage of agreement in the three pilot studies, 
initially assessed by both, of 83.7%.
Comparative economic analysis approach
All cost data were adjusted to a common currency (Euro 
in 2017 (€2017)) and price year using the Campbell 
and Cochrane Economics Methods Group–Evidence 
for Policy and Practice Information and Coordinating 
Centre cost converter.14 We adjusted the original esti-
mate of cost from the original price year to a target price 
year of the €2017, using a gross domestic product deflator 
index (GDPD), obtained from the International Mone-
tary Fund World Economic Outlook Database GDPD 
index data set.15 Subsequently, we converted the price- 
year adjusted cost estimate from the original currency 
to €2017, using conversion rates based on purchasing 
power parities (PPP) for GDP (the 2017 implied conver-
sion factor was US$1=€1.13, the €2017 conversion factor 
was €1=US$1.2, while with regard to British pounds, the 
conversion factor was £1=€0.88). PPP values adjust appro-
priately for differences in current price levels between 
countries, thus allowing comparisons based on a common 
set of average international prices; this is an advantage 
over pure exchange- rate conversions and GDP per capita 
approaches as PPPs eliminate differences in price levels 
between countries in the process of conversion. For 
studies that did not state the year of cost calculation, the 
costs were calculated 1 year before the publication year of 
each respective study.
Synthesis of cost-effectiveness
In order to synthesise the cost- effectiveness results, the 
DRM approach was used, which is a classification system 
developed for summarising and interpreting the results 
of economic evaluations in systematic reviews.16 The DRM 
is a three- by- three matrix with the following classification 
options:
1. Strong dominance for the intervention when the in-
cremental cost- effectiveness measure shows the inter-
vention compared with no intervention as: (i) more 
effective and less costly or (ii) as effective and less cost-
ly or (iii) more effective and equal cost.
2. Weak dominance for the intervention when the mea-
sure shows the intervention compared with no inter-
vention as: (iv) effective and equally costly or (v) more 
effective and more costly or (vi) less effective and less 
costly.
3. Non- dominance for the intervention when the mea-
sure shows the intervention compared with no inter-
vention as: (vii) less effective and more costly or (viii) 
less effective and equally as costly or (ix) as effective 
and more costly.
Within our DRM, only studies that compared interven-
tions to no intervention were included in the matrix.
Patient and public involvement
This study was performed under contract for the Euro-
pean Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). 
Patients or the public were not involved in the design, 
or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination plans of our 
research.
RESULTS
The initial study search yielded 20 513 studies after 
removal of the duplicates and according to the speci-
fied selection criteria, only 66 were further assessed for 
eligibility via full text. Through the assessment of the full- 
texts, 52 studies were excluded for the following reasons: 
inadequate data on costs and/or cost- effectiveness (n=2), 
they were reviews (n=15), not referring to respiratory 
outbreaks (n=29), not referring to outbreaks of infectious 
diseases (n=2) and conference abstracts with no full text 
available (n=4). Additionally, three full- text papers were 
identified through the screening of the reference lists of 
the selected manuscripts, and hence, a total number of 
17 econometric studies were considered in our analysis. 
The flowchart of the study selection process is presented 
in figure 1.
Overall, 11 out of the 17 studies were of high meth-
odological quality (>80%), 5 were categorised as of 
good quality (60%–80%) and only 1 was of medium 
quality (40%–60%) due to missing quality criteria not 
mentioned by the authors including the comparative 
intervention, sensitivity analysis, incremental costs and 
outcomes. Online supplemental appendix 2 presents the 
overall quality appraisal score, for studies related to cost 
of infectious disease outbreaks and for sources related 
to preparedness, preventive and response measures 
concerning infectious disease outbreaks. The quality 
appraisal of partial and full economic evaluation studies is 
in online supplemental appendices 3 and 4, respectively. 
It is important to note that for the studies where a partial 
economic evaluation was performed, we only performed 
calculations for the items of the quality appraisal tool that 
were applicable.
Comparative cost analysis of infectious respiratory disease 
outbreaks
Regarding infectious respiratory disease outbreaks, six 
studies were included.17–22 All studies referred to influ-
enza as the disease, either relating to pandemic H1N1 
or seasonal Influenza B. Geographically, the studies 
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were performed in the USA,17 Spain,18 22 France,19 New 
Zealand and Australia.20 21 Five out of the six studies were 
observational in design (cross- sectional or retrospec-
tive) and used collected data;18–22 one study was based 
on a simulation model.17 Similarly, five out of the six 
studies assessed costs from a healthcare system perspec-
tive;17 18 20–22 however, societal (n=3),17–19 governmental 
(n=1)17 and payer (n=1)19 perspectives were also assessed. 
Discounting in costs was not necessary for any of the 
included studies as the implementation timeframe had a 
duration of less than 1 year, and sensitivity analyses were 
performed only in three studies.17 19 21 A detailed descrip-
tion of the characteristics of the included illness studies is 
presented in online supplemental appendix 5.
Table 1 presents an analytical overview of the direct 
and indirect costs associated with influenza outbreaks. 
Direct costs mainly refer to medical and healthcare costs 
related to the outbreaks, along with the costs of response 
measures. Indirect costs included the loss of income, the 
loss of business and the loss of productivity. The overall 
direct costs reported in the studies were calculated at the 
patient level where possible.
The most recent study was a simulation study by Prager 
et al,17 in which multiple scenarios were assessed through 
simulation models for the US population so as to esti-
mate the total economic burden of pandemic influenza 
outbreaks in the USA, taking into account both the 
scenario of an adequately vaccinated population and 
the opposite. The results indicated that medical expen-
ditures for a pandemic influenza outbreak could reach 
83.2 billion €2017 in the no vaccination scenario and 
67.3 billion €2017 in the vaccination scenario. Notably, 
for indirect cost estimations, vaccination in a pandemic 
scenario would reduce workday losses by 22.2 million 
days, when compared with no vaccination.
Silva et al19 focused on an influenza outbreak in France 
between 2010 and 2011 and extrapolated the results 
to the entire country with a hypothetical approximate 
number of 2 million influenza cases (3.2% of the French 
population), for which they calculated an overall cost of 
151 million €2017 for the French Health Insurance System. 
Direct costs per patient ranged between 35.26 €2017 and 
73.91 €2017, with higher indirect costs of 97.88 €2017 per 
Figure 1 Flowchart.
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day due to absence from work, for those within the 15–65 
age group.
Two studies assessed the cost of an influenza outbreak 
from an intensive care unit (ICU) and hospital perspec-
tive.20 21 One focused on ICU and hospital costs derived 
from an influenza pandemic in 2009 in New Zealand 
(among 1224 cases, of which 122 were admitted to ICUs), 
which surpassed 40.8 million €2017 at an average cost of 
32 167 €2017 per patient, with significantly increased costs 
for patients with underlining comorbidities.21 The mean 
total hospitalisation cost (normal and ICU) per case 
surpassed 53 553 €2017. Similarly, in a study that included 
762 H1N1 cases from both Australia and New Zealand, 
the mean cost per ICU patient was 61 368 €2017, with a 
per- day cost of 4767 €2017.20 On the contrary, the non- ICU 
patient had a mean cost of 10 755 €2017; however, overall 





year Perspective Direct costs (€, 2017) Indirect costs (€, 2017)
Prager et al 
(2017)17




Seasonal (no vaccination): €5.92 billion
Seasonal (vaccination): €9.96 billion
Pandemic (no vaccination): €81.18 billion
Pandemic (vaccination): €65.59 billion
Illness- related workdays losses
(a) Vaccination and no vaccination in a seasonal scenario: 
vaccination contributes to more workday losses than no 
vaccination
(b) Vaccination and no vaccination in a pandemic scenario: 
vaccination reduces workday losses by 22.2 million days 
compared with no vaccination
Morales- 







Non- pregnant women: €3 908.70
Pregnant women: €2 227.10
Total indirect cost/patient
Non- pregnant women: €107.18
Pregnant women: €63.83











All ages—€107 883 835
0–4 years old—€18 908 254
5–14 years old—€52 474 781
15–65 years old—€21 590 741
≥65 years old—€6 940 836














Total mean cost: €19 296 136
Total ICU costs: €6 107 069
Total non- ICU costs: €12 961 942
Mean cost of ICU/patient: €61 368
Mean cost of non- ICU/patient: €10 755
Mean cost in ICU/per patient and per 
day: €4 767
Non- reported







Total ICU costs: €40 807 660
Median ICU cost/patient: €22 540
Mean ICU cost/patient: €32 168
Total hospital costs/patient
Median hospital cost: €39 696
Mean hospital cost: 53 553
Treatment costs in ICU per subgroup
(a) Cost/patient with and without pre- 
existing comorbidity
€16 100 and €28 980, respectively
(b) Cost/patient with viral pneumonitis 
and with other influenza syndromes
€22 212 and €12 880, respectively
Non- reported
Rodríguez- 
Rieiro et al 
(2009)22
Spain, 2009 Healthcare 
system
Total cost: €36 700 000
Median cost per hospitalisation 
(concomitant chronic disease): €2 205
Median cost per hospitalisation (without a 
medical condition): €1 172
Non- reported
The adjustment was performed from Canadian $, US$, Australian $, British pounds £ and converted to Euro (Germany has been selected as target currency in these 
cases). Currencies from European Union countries adjusted to their currency.
The cost data include all forms of cost derived from inclusion studies, such as overall/total cost, mean/average cost, income loss, labour cost, household cost, 
savings, cost per case, etc.
For studies without currency year indicated, the previous year of publication was selected for adjustment.
*Confirmed or extrapolated/hypothetical cases on which they base the economic evaluation.
ICU, intensive care unit.
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non- ICU patient costs surpassed those of ICU patients 
(12.96 million €2017 vs 6.1 million €2017), leading to a 
total hospitalisation cost of 19.3 million €2017 for the 2009 
influenza outbreak.
Similarly, Rodriquez- Rieiro et al22 studied the hospi-
talisation costs that occurred during the 2009 influenza 
pandemic in Spain, which reached 36.7 million €2017 for 
11 449 hospitalisations—during which the appearance 
of comorbidities led to higher average costs per patient 
(2205 €2017 vs 1172 €2017, respectively). Specific popula-
tions in Spain were assessed by Morales- Suárez- Varela et 
al18 who estimated direct costs for medical visits, medica-
tion and diagnostic tests at €3908 €2017 for non- pregnant 
women and 2227 €2017 for pregnant women of reproduc-
tive age, with indirect costs estimated at 107 €2017 and 64 
€2017, respectively.
Cost-effectiveness studies of measures in averting and/or 
responding to infectious respiratory disease outbreaks
We identified 11 studies23–33 referring to preparedness, 
preventative and response measures, to influenza outbreaks, 
presented in detail in online supplemental appendix 6. 
Two studies were observational (based in the Netherlands 
and the UK),23 24 and the remaining nine were simulation 
models (four US models, with one study each modelled 
for Canada, France, Australia, Israel and one referring 
to developed countries in general). All included studies 
either used a cost- effectiveness or a cost- utility economic 
evaluation approach. The studies’ timeframes ranged 
from 2004 to 2018. Regarding the perspective for direct 
and indirect costs, a healthcare system or society approach 
was consistently presented.
The preparedness, preventive and response measures 
described included three pharmaceutical interventions 
(vaccination as a response measure, general vaccination, 
antiviral drug therapy and stockpiling),31–33 four non- 
pharmaceutical interventions (screening at the point of 
contact, community contact reduction, volunteer isola-
tion/quarantine, school closure and the use of personal 
protective measures)23–25 28 and four combined pharma-
ceutical and non- pharmaceutical interventions.26 27 29 30 
Table 2 presents the details of the cost- effectiveness studies 
on preparedness and response measures for infectious 
respiratory disease outbreaks. Further details on the 
comparative analysis of health indexes gained when 
adverting or responding to respiratory outbreaks can be 
found in online supplemental appendix 7.
With regard to studies that compared multiple inter-
ventions, a simulation model of pandemic influenza in 
the USA studied the cost- effectiveness of stockpile strategy 
and concluded that expanded adjuvanted vaccination 
seemed to be the most cost- effective strategy, averting 
68% of infections and deaths and gaining 404 303 QALYs 
at $10 844 (€9600 €2017) per QALY gained relative to the 
stockpiling strategy.30 Saunders- Hastings et al,26 using a 
simulated population of 1.2 million people (reflective of 
Ottawa, Canada), performed a cost- effectiveness analysis 
of six interventions including vaccination, school closure, 
antiviral prophylaxis and other measures. The authors 
concluded that vaccination was the most cost- effective 
intervention when compared with other interventions 
while the least cost- effective intervention was school 
closure in conjunction with community- contact reduc-
tion, personal protective measures, voluntary isolation 
and quarantine. In particular, the cost per life- year saved 
was estimated to be $2581 (1700 €2017) for combined 
vaccination and antiviral treatment, while an estimated 
cost of $260 472/life- year saved (€171 590 €2017) was 
noted for school closure in conjunction with other inter-
ventions. Finally, Halder et al27 aimed to evaluate the most 
cost- effective strategies suitable for a future pandemic 
with H1N1 2009 characteristics in Australia. The results 
showed that the strategy with the lowest cost was the dual 
strategy of individual school closure for 2 weeks along with 
antiviral drug strategies, with a total cost of approximately 
AU$632 (376.31 €2017) per case averted. The strategy with 
the highest cost was the dual strategy of school closure 
along with the continuous—50% workplace closure, with 
a cost of $103 million (61.3 million €2017), per 100 000 
population.
Comparative cost-effectiveness analysis
A DRM approach is presented in figure 2. These inter-
ventions include both pharmaceutical measures and 
non- pharmaceutical measures. The interventions were 
compared with the ‘no intervention’ scenario, with the 
exception of one study29 in which the comparators were 
vaccination versus self- isolation, which was subsequently 
excluded from the DRM.
Pharmaceutical measures
Vaccination as a response measure
With the application of our inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, four studies assessed vaccination as a response 
measure in the context of an outbreak and included 
a cost analysis. Overall, as highlighted in the majority 
of the studies, vaccination as a response measure was 
noted to have a more significant clinical effect than 
comparators and was more cost- saving in most cases. 
According to Sander et al,30 the most clinically effec-
tive intervention was expanded adjuvant vaccina-
tion which contributed to 404 030 QALYs. Similarly, 
Khazeni calculated that with expanded adjuvanted 
vaccination, 45 941 deaths would be averted.31 Addi-
tionally, Saunders- Hastings et al26 concluded that 
the most cost- effective approach for controlling a 
pandemic was vaccination in combination with anti-
viral therapy and prophylaxis. However, a review of the 
results showed that much of the cost- effectiveness of 
pharmaceutical interventions were driven by vigorous 
vaccination campaigns, while the contribution of anti-
viral drugs’ was not of significance. Finally, Madema 
et al33 through a simulation model of an influenza 
pandemic among developing countries calculated 
the costs and assessed the effectiveness of two types 
of vaccines, an egg- based and a cell culture- based, in 
copyright.
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comparison with no intervention. Overall, vaccination 
was more cost- effective than no intervention; however, 
vaccination with cell culture- based vaccines was the 
most cost- effective strategy with a cost of 3779 €2017 per 
life- year gained. General vaccination was also assessed 
by Sander et al,30 who noted it to be both more cost- 
saving and effective than the unmitigated pandemic 
scenario, although when comparing prevaccination 
with low- efficacy vaccines with full targeted antiviral 
prophylaxis, it was less effective and more costly.
Antiviral drugs
Antiviral drug strategies were assessed in five studies, 
where it was noted that they were both more effec-
tive and cost- saving than the no intervention scenario, 
primarily when used as targeted prophylaxis. 
According to Halder et al,27 antiviral drug strategies 
such as antiviral treatment and antiviral treatment 
in combination with household confinement and 
extended prophylaxis can result in reduced attack 
rates of 7.6% and 3.5% in comparison to the unmiti-
gated attack rate of 13%. The costs of these strategies 
are also lower than the cost of no intervention.
Moreover, therapeutic treatment and postexpo-
sure prophylaxis for exposed individuals (targeted 
prophylaxis) were shown to be the most cost- saving.32 
Consistent with the above, antiviral therapy in combi-
nation with a layered non- pharmaceutical approach 
seemed to reduce the overall economic costs the most 
and was identified as more effective when compared 
with no intervention.26 Furthermore, it was noted that 
expanded antiviral prophylaxis could help delay a 
pandemic when additional strategies are implemented 
Figure 2 Dominance ranking matrix for pharmaceutical and non- pharmaceutical strategies. *+: the intervention is less cost 
saving than the comparator; 0: the intervention is equally cost saving with the comparator; −: the intervention is more cost 
saving than the comparator. **+: The intervention is more effective than the comparator; 0: the intervention is equally effective 
with the comparator; −: the intervention is less effective than the comparator.
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and would also lead to averting 32 745 deaths in the 
USA.31 Finally, Sander et al30 used a stochastic simu-
lation model of pandemic influenza in the USA, 
aiming to evaluate the potential economic impact of 
16 different mitigation interventions from a societal 
perspective. Conclusively, targeted antiviral prophy-
laxis was both the most cost- saving and effective inter-
vention with a cost of $127 per capita (€118.73 €2017), 
with the scenario of implementation of expanded anti-
viral prophylaxis leading to a total of 282 329 QALYs 
gained.
Stockpile strategy
The stockpile strategy was assessed in three of the 
studies included in this systematic review. Based on 
the findings, stockpiling antiviral prophylaxis in the 
context of a pandemic was noted to be both cost- 
saving for the society and avert loss of life compared 
with no intervention.30 Moreover, prepandemic stock-
piling of antiviral drugs would be more effective and 
cost- saving than no intervention if antiviral drugs were 
administered either solely as a treatment or as short- 
term prophylaxis for exposed individuals.32 Finally, 
stockpiling was also found more effective than a no 
intervention scenario (averting 29 761 deaths in the 
USA), although when compared with other interven-
tions, expanded vaccination and prophylaxis were 
found to be more effective.31
Non-pharmaceutical measures
Pre hospitalisation screening
Lankelma et al23 assessed the cost- effectiveness of 
screening patients with acute respiratory tract infec-
tion for influenza before hospital admission. Overall 
costs of screening were estimated at 98 968 €2017 for 
1546 tests and 624 cases and reported net savings of 
388 317 €2017 for the healthcare system. Point- of- care 
testing for influenza before hospital admission was 
identified as a cost- effective intervention.23
Community contact reduction
Community contact reduction was assessed in two 
studies, where it was either implemented solely or 
in combination with other pharmaceutical and non- 
pharmaceutical measures. Home confinement was 
noted as cost- effective as a preventive measure in the 
context of influenza epidemics, if the proportion of 
compliance is adequate and infected individuals ask 
for medical assistance, regardless of the severity level 
of the pandemic.26 Isolation of infected individuals was 
found to be among the most effective interventions, 
whereas combined with community contact reduction, 
personal protective measures and antiviral treatment, 
self- isolation had the lowest cost.27
School closure
The effectiveness and the economic burden of school 
closure were evaluated in four studies, highlighting 
that the duration of school closure and potentially 
combined strategies significantly affect its impact. 
Sadique et al24 estimated the economic burden of 
school closure in the UK from a societal perspective 
and showed that the estimated costs of school closure 
were high, at 0.28–1.68 billion €2017 per week and the 
authors concluded that school closure was likely to 
significantly add an extra economic burden on the 
health system through staff absenteeism, even if school 
closure may delay infectious disease transmission. 
Similarly, Sander et al,30 who studied school closure 
as an additional intervention to full targeted antiviral 
prophylaxis or prevaccination found that while school 
closure further improves health outcomes (gaining 
51 QALYs), it was the least cost- effective measure as it 
increased the total cost to society by $2700 per capita 
(€2524 €2017). Additionally, school closure produced 
only a small reduction in attack rate, whether imple-
mented in combination with other interventions or 
alone.26 Finally, exclusive school closure for 2 weeks 
along with the continuous 50% workplace closure, 
antiviral treatment, household antiviral prophylaxis 
and extended antiviral prophylaxis, had the lowest 
illness attack rate (2.4%) and one of the lowest costs. 
On the contrary, school closure as a sole intervention 
to counterbalance infectious respiratory diseases was 
not a cost- effective measure.27
Personal protective measures
Personal protective measures such as face masks and 
hand hygiene were assessed in two of the included 
studies, noting that they could contribute to the 
control of a pandemic, dependant though on the 
exposed and susceptible individuals’ compliance rate, 
the setting and the overall burden of the respiratory 
pandemic.26 28 Tracht et al aimed to assess the cost- 
effectiveness of facemasks (N95 grade) in reducing 
the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, using a simu-
lation model of the US population and identified an 
economic burden of 728.28 billion €2017 (incl. direct 
and indirect costs). Notably, if masks are worn by 10% 
and 50% of the adult population of the US net savings 
were calculated at 418.75 billion €2017and 501.9 
billion €2017, respectively. Hence, the use of face masks 
were identified as a cost- effective preventive measure 
depending on the population’s level of compliance.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this systematic literature review of econo-
metric analysis studies was to assess the economics of 
preparedness when contrasted with the cost of infec-
tious respiratory disease outbreaks primarily within the 
context of European and OECD countries (excluding 
Japan and South Korea). Overall, the economic burden 
of infectious disease outbreaks is costly to healthcare 
systems, or to governments and society reflecting the 
medical costs for response activities including both the 
treatment of the confirmed cases and the surveillance 
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and elimination of the disease’s transmission, as well 
as indirect costs which were also substantial.
In general, the majority of direct costs seemed to 
primarily reflect cost of additional personnel hours, 
which are mandatory for the management of the 
infected cases, for the organisation of response plan-
ning and contact tracing, for providing educational 
training and materials as well as laboratory costs. With 
regard to indirect costs, these could in many cases be 
greater than the direct costs, especially when school 
closures and/or workplace closures are enacted across 
a population, which in turn impact productivity and 
increase the economic burden.
While all the identified pharmaceutical and non- 
pharmaceutical interventions lead to a health benefit 
for the individual or the society, the cost benefit of 
such interventions differs. With regard to the poten-
tial non- pharmaceutical strategies, we identified that 
the use of personal protective measures, such as a 
facemask, is both cost- saving and effective, as also is 
prehospitalisation screening among suspect cases. On 
the other hand, all studies that assessed the impact of 
school closure noted that although it is an effective 
measure in reducing transmission, it is not cost- saving 
as it leads to increased economic burden. Moreover, 
when school closure was used as a sole intervention, 
then the use of limited duration school closure was 
significantly more cost- effective compared with contin-
uous school closure.24 Community contact reduc-
tion was identified to have a positive health impact 
but had ambiguous results with regard to its poten-
tial cost saving as one study26 noted that it is a cost- 
saving intervention, while the other27 noted that social 
distancing strategies, such as reduced workplace atten-
dance, were not a cost- saving measure primarily due 
to productivity losses, especially during longer periods 
of closure. Productivity losses primarily were noted 
to arise from pandemic related deaths and illness 
coupled with those losses due to interventions such as 
workplace closure and child- care of an ill child. It is 
important to note that non- pharmaceutical strategies 
were mostly applied complementary with a pharma-
ceutical measure or in combination with other non- 
pharmaceutical strategies in order to enhance their 
effectiveness. However, their cost- effectiveness highly 
depended on the duration, the level of compliance 
from the population and the type and burden of the 
infectious disease. It should moreover be noted that 
cost- effectiveness of measures will vary depending on 
the epidemiology of the disease in question.
With regard to pharmaceutical interventions, vacci-
nation as a rapid response measure for infected and 
suspected individuals was noted to have a more signif-
icant clinical effect than comparators and was more 
cost- saving in most cases. As for antiviral treatment, the 
majority of the findings noted that it is a cost- effective 
strategy, especially when combined with other phar-
maceutical and non- pharmaceutical interventions or 
when used as targeted prophylaxis for exposed indi-
viduals. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis was the most 
cost- saving and effective intervention, while stock-
piling was cost saving in most cases and averted loss of 
life when compared with no intervention.
The current number of economic evaluation or cost- 
effectiveness studies of influenza outbreak prepared-
ness measures is small, with an increase shown since 
the 2009 influenza pandemic; however, it is important 
to note that these studies refer to the evidence 
published before the COVID-19 pandemic. There are 
only a limited number of related reviews, however of 
different scope focusing primarily on policy recom-
mendations34 or used dynamic transmission models in 
the included economic assessments of pandemic influ-
enza preparedness measures based on significantly 
older studies.6 Additionally, most of the existing review 
studies either evaluate the overall economic burden of 
the disease or the cost- effectiveness of different phar-
maceutical and non- pharmaceutical interventions 
without necessarily them reflecting the economics of 
outbreaks of infectious respiratory diseases.
Placing the above into context and following the 
assessment of the methodological approaches used 
across studies, it is essential to note the minimum 
contents that economic outbreaks of respira-
tory studies should include to help inform future 
and upcoming research, especially in light of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. These include clearly noting of 
the study year, the population at risk and, the popu-
lation infected, the type of economic perspective (ie, 
healthcare, societal, etc), the study timeframe and 
discounting, as well as detailed reporting of the direct 
and indirect costs of the respiratory outcome and the 
interventions applied.
Strengths and limitations
A significant strength of this review is the comprehensive 
approach that was followed and the assessment of data 
quality—which indicated that the majority of the studies 
included were of high quality. Second, the synthesis of the 
results was performed using the DRM approach, which 
allowed for a direct comparison of the cost- effectiveness of 
each intervention to the null intervention.
However, there are a few limitations: first, costs and 
resources varied between different countries, different 
regional settings and over time, making the cost 
component comparison of cost- effectiveness measures 
complex to interpret. Moreover, we only focused on 
EU and OECD analogous high- income countries 
excluding Japan and South Korea, and hence our 
cost- effectiveness analyses are not applicable and 
generalisable to other countries and particularly 
middle- income and low- income countries. Addition-
ally, discrepancies in context and populations likely 
affect the implementation and efficacy of interven-
tions, undermining even the effectiveness elements 
comparability in the cost- effectiveness measures, 
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especially in complex multi- component public health 
interventions. In addition, our study did not include 
studies published before 2003 or after 2019. Also, it 
should be noticed that publication bias may exist due 
to the English language restriction applied. Another 
limitation to be noted is that this review excluded 
seasonal influenza outbreaks since these occur on a 
yearly basis. Furthermore, this study was performed 
before the impact of COVID-19 and hence reflects the 
published knowledge before the current pandemic. 
Thus, the results cannot be directly extrapolated to 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
CONCLUSION
The value of this systematic review of econometric 
studies is to provide a synthesis of the evidence of the 
cost of respiratory infectious disease outbreaks and the 
cost- effectiveness of specific interventions that can be 
applied in response. Furthermore, our assessment identi-
fies a minimum number of econometric measures which 
should be recorded during the reporting of respiratory 
infectious disease outbreaks that would aid future deci-
sion making. Our cost analysis results give evidence to 
public health policymakers, primarily in the EU or the 
USA, as to the cost- effectiveness of a range of pharma-
ceutical and non- pharmaceutical intervention strategies 
which may be applied to mitigate or respond to infectious 
respiratory disease outbreaks.
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12 (fiscal or financial or finance or funding).tw. 178545 
13 Cost minimization analysis/ 3375 
14 (cost adj estimate$).mp. 3181 
15 (cost adj variables$).mp. 188 
16 (unit adj cost$).mp. 4210 
17 investment$.mp. or investments/ 49607 
18 or/1-17 906830 
19 "Emergency Preparedness".tw. 1780 
20 (Community Preparedness or Community Recovery 
or Emergency Operations Coordination or 
(Emergency Public Information and Warning) or 
Fatality Management or Information Sharing or 
Mass Care or Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
or (Medical Materiel Management and Distribution) 
or Medical Surge or Non-Pharmaceutical 
Interventions or Public Health Laboratory 
Testing).mp. 
3358 
21 exp Public Health Surveillance/ 210835 
22 (Epidemiological Investigation or (Responder 
Safety adj Health) or Volunteer Management).mp. 
3638 
23 (disaster preparedness or public health 
emergencies).mp. 
2176 
24 ((Detection adj assessment) or policy development 
or policy implementation or policy adaptation or 
health services or (coordination adj communication) 
or emergency risk communication or personal 
preparedness).mp. 
124325 
25 ((state or local or national or legal or business or 
healthcare) and preparedness).mp. 
5302 
26 (vaccination or immuni?ation or anti?viral 
medication or personal hygiene or hand hygiene or 
household ventilation or ((food and safety) or 
storage) or food hygiene or respiratory etiquette or 
(washing and saniti?ing) or social distancing or 
triage or food security or (emergency adj3 food) or 
(school adj3 closure) or public gathering* or public 
meeting* or household isolation or quarantine or 
PPE or personal protective equipment or 
(environmental adj3 cleaning)).mp. 
703894 
27 or/19-26 1031364 
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28 exp disease outbreak/ or exp communicable 
diseases/ 
119087 
29 (disease outbreak or outbreak or epidemic or 
pandemic or public health emergency).mp. 
207717 
30 (avian flu or abola or EVD or H1N1 or H5N1 or 
infectious disease or influenza or swine flu or flu or 
MERS or Middle East Respiratory Syndrome).mp. 
198862 
31 (SARS or Severe Acute Respiratory syndrome or 
measles or zika or cholera or H7N9 or dengue or 
fever or plague or fever or malaria or polio).mp. 
561066 
32 (Bacillus cereus or Campylobacter jejuni or 
Clostridium or Cryptosporidium or Cyclospora 
cayetanensis or (E adj coli) or Hepatitis A or Listeria 
monocytogenes or Noroviruses or Salmonella or 
Shigella or Staphylococcus aureus or 
Staphylococcus or Vibrio parahaemolyticus or 
Vibrio vulnificus).mp. 
579612 
33 (Diphtheria or Haemophilus influenzae type b or 
Hib or Hepatitis B or Human Papillomavirus or 
HPV).mp. 
241684 
34 ((Meningococcal adj Infection$) or Mump$ or 
Pertussis or Whooping Cough or Pneumococcal 
Infection$ or Polio or Rotavirus or Rubella or 
German Measles or Tetanus or varicella or chicken 
pox or vectorbourne diseases or vector?bourne 
disease$ or waterbourne diseases or water?bourne 
disease$ or Cholera or Diarrhea or diarrhoea).mp. 
421975 
35 (Typhoid fever or Giardiasis or Schistosomiasis or 
Dracunculiasis or Dysentery or Cryptosporidiosis or 
amoebiasis or Traveler$s diarrhea or travelers 
diarrhoea).mp. 
56723 
36 exp infectious disease medicine/ or exp malaria/ or 
exp influenza, human/ or SARS virus/ or exp 
norovirus/ or exp coronavirus infections/ or exp 
measles/ or exp poliomyelitis/ or exp chickenpox/ 
213621 
37 (anthrax or botulism or brucellosis or 
campylobacter enteritis or chikungunya or 
chlamydia$ or CJD or Creutzfeldt?Jakob).mp. 
78479 
38 (diptheria or echinococcosis or gonococcal or 
haemophilus influenzae or hepatitis or HIV or AIDS 
or human immunodeficiency virus or acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome).mp. 
938033 
39 (legionnaires?disease or leptospirosis or listeriosis 
or lyme or streptococcus pneumoniae or Q fever or 
rabies or congenital rubella or salmonella or shiga 
toxin or verocytotoxin?producing E?coli or STEC 
or VTEC or HUS or haemoltic?uraemic or 
hemoltic?uremic).mp. 
206207 
40 (shigellosis or smallpox or syphilis or congenital 
syphilis or tick?borne viral encephalitis or 
congenital toxoplasmosis or trichinellosis or 
tuberculosis or TB or typhoid or paratyphoid or 
VHF or viral hemorrhagic fever$ or viral 
haemorrhagic fever$ or West Nile virus or Yellow 
fever or (enteritis adj3 yersinia)).mp. 
313309 
41 or/28-40 2651637 
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Date of Search EconLit 
# Search Terms Hits 
30/8/2019 1 cost OR ( deductibles and coinsurance ) OR Medical savings accounts OR 
health expenditure OR economic OR ( fees and charges ) OR Economic 
evaluation OR cost effectiveness analysis OR Cost utility analysis OR cost 
benefit analysis OR Cost consequence analysis OR Investment  
1,344,466 
30/8/2019 2 (Emergency Preparedness) OR Preparedness OR emergency OR 
Surveillance OR disaster OR ( detection or diagnosis or identification or 
early detection ) OR screening OR vaccination OR hygiene OR school 
closure OR quarantine  
48,619 
30/8/2019 3 disease outbreak OR disease OR infectious diseases OR communicable 
diseases OR outbreak OR pandemic OR epidemic  
9,194 









Search Term 1 Search Term 2 Search Term 3 Results (n) 
28/7/2019 cost-effective infectious   139 
28/7/2020 Emergency Public 
Information and Warning 
cost   8 
28/7/2021 Health Surveillance infectious cost 10 
30/7/2022 economics health preparedness   39 
30/7/2023 cost-effectiveness cost effectiveness health preparedness 8 
30/7/2024 prevention cost disease outbreaks 42 
30/7/2025 economic evaluation Public health 
surveillance 
  12 
30/7/2026 investment Infectious disease outbreak 16 
30/7/2027 economics H1N1   16 
30/7/2028 economics flu outbreak 25 
1/8/2019 Cost-effectiveness  ebola   4 
1/8/2019 economics disease threats   171 
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Appendix 2. Total quality appraisal score (in percentages) for all included studies (n=17) 
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Appendix 3. Quality appraisal score by item/question for the partial economic evaluation studies (n=6)  
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Appendix 5. Characteristics of cost analyses studies of influenza outbreaks 
Study, 
(Publication Year) 
Setting, year Study population 
(n) 
Economic Evaluation Approach Perspective Time Horizon Type of Sensitivity 
analysis 




The population of 
the USA  
Cost of illness (although 
mentions about cost-effective of 
vaccination in the pandemic 
scenario, No CEA outcomes) 
Simulation model  Healthcare system, 
Governmental, 
Societal 









with influenza A 
(H1N1) 
Partial Economic Evaluation 
(Cost of illness) 
Observational  Healthcare system,  
Societal 
4 months Not performed 





Influenza B (201) 
Partial Economic Evaluation 
(cost of illness) 
Observational  Payer, Societal 3 months One-way sensitivity 
analysis and 
probabilistic analysis 





All Influenza cases 
(H1N1) in New 
Zealand and 
Australia (762) 
Partial Economic Evaluation 
Cost of illness  
 
Observational Healthcare system 3 months  
Not performed 







1224 – 1122 
hospitalizations 
and + 122 ICU 
Partial Economic Evaluation,  
Cost of illness  
(incl. hypothetical cost-
effectiveness analysis) 
Observational Healthcare system  12 months Probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis  







Partial Economic Evaluation 
(Cost of illness)  
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Perspective Timeframe Discount Sensitivity analysis 
Observational studies 




Patients with acute RTI at the 
emergency department  
(1546 tests, 624 cases) 
Partial Economic 
Evaluation 
Healthcare system  4,5 months N/A Not performed 








Societal 1 year N/A Scenarios 





200 participants, data extrapolated Both cost-benefit and 
cost-effectiveness 
analysis 
Public health and 
societal 
1 year 1% for 
costs 
Not performed 








Healthcare system  Lifetime 1.5% Multivariate sensitivity 
analyses  











Lifetime 3% Scenarios 






Simulation of the US  
(302 million people:73 million 





and societal  
1 year N/A Multivariate sensitivity 
analyses  






North Carolina State University 




Healthcare system  5 months N/A One-way and two-way 
sensitivity analyses 




Residents of a 1 632-million-person 
city  
Cost Utility Analysis Societal  6 months 3%  Multivariate sensitivity 
analyses  



















Population of Israel  
(1 618 200 cases) 












Developed Countries  
(1 Billion people) 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis 
Healthcare system  Not clearly 
stated 
5% Performed unclear 
RTI: Acute respiratory tract infection, N/A: Not applicable, UK: United Kingdom, US: United States 
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Intervention(s)/Screening methods vs. comparators Outcomes/benefits 
Prage




Case 1: No Vaccination, Seasonal Outbreak  




Case 3: Vaccination, Seasonal Outbreak  
Case 4: Vaccination, Pandemic Outbreak 
Productivity loss and behavioural response 
In the case of a pandemic influenza outbreak 
Vaccination: 
1. Reduces illness-related workday losses from 83.3 million days to 61.1 million days 
(a reduction of 22.2 million days). 
2. Causes 7.4 million days of workday losses due to the time that people spend on getting 
the vaccination doses. 
3. Can reduce public avoidance behaviours by 25%. 
 
In the case of a seasonal influenza outbreak 
Vaccination: 
1. Reduces illness-related workday losses from 18.7 million days to 13.9 million days 
(a reduction of 4.8 million days). 
2. Causes 6.7 million days of workday losses due to the time that people spend obtaining 
vaccinations.  










1. Egg-based vaccine manufacture  






Cases, PCP consultations and hospitalizations prevented 
Cell culture-based intervention vs no intervention:  
Cell culture-based intervention avoids 75 million influenza cases, 3.78 million PCP 
consultations for influenza treatment and, respectively, 5.81 million and 1.21 million 
influenza-related hospitalizations and excess deaths.  
 
Egg-based vaccine intervention vs no intervention: Egg-based vaccine intervention 
leads to vaccination of 17% of the population, which avoids 29.8 million influenza cases, 
1.74 million PCP visits, 2.67 million hospitalizations and 556 000 deaths  
 
Cell culture-based intervention vs egg-based vaccine intervention with 17% 
vaccine coverage: 
Cell culture-based intervention strategy leads to vaccination of 37% of the population, 
avoiding an additional 35 million influenza cases, 2.04 million PCP consultations for 
influenza treatment, 3.14 million influenza-related hospitalizations and 654 500 excess 
deaths 
 
Years of life lost (YLL) 
Cell culture-based intervention strategy: 2.56 million 
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1. Vaccination and antiviral treatment 
2. Vaccination, antiviral treatment and antiviral prophylaxis 
3. Community-contact reduction, personal protective measures and voluntary isolation 
4. Community-contact reduction, personal protective measures, voluntary isolation and 
antiviral treatment 
5. School closure, community-contact reduction, personal protective measures, voluntary 
isolation and quarantine 




7. No intervention 
 
Hospitalizations 
In case of no intervention, a total of 2 472 pandemic-associated hospitalizations have 
been estimated. 
Following no intervention, vaccination interventions (combined with other 
interventions) contributed to 765-815 hospitalizations.  




1. 3,026  
2. 2,801  
3. 1,767  
4. 1,607  
5. 1,393  
6. 267 
7. 9,421  
 
Reductions of illness (H2N2 cases) 
Vaccination, personal protective measures, combined voluntary isolation and quarantine 
procedures resulted in the greatest reductions, producing attack rates of 50.0%, 45.5% 
and 33.9%, respectively. 
Antiviral treatment, antiviral prophylaxis, school closure and community-contact 
reduction produced only small reductions in illness attack rate, whether implemented 
alone or in combination with other interventions. Even in the absence of any 
pharmaceutical intervention, adherence to rigorous non-pharmaceutical protocols 
-school closure, community-contact reduction, personal protective measures, voluntary 






1) Vaccination and antiviral pharmacotherapy in quantities similar to those currently 
available in the U.S. stockpile (stockpiled strategy),  
2) Stockpiled strategy but with the expanded distribution of antiviral agents (expanded 
prophylaxis strategy), and  






Clinical attack rate 
The clinical attack rate has been 11%, 17%, 19% and 33% for expanded adjuvanted 




Expanded adjuvanted vaccination – 45 941 deaths averted  
Expanded antiviral prophylaxis – 32 745 deaths averted  
Stockpiled strategy – 29 761 deaths averted  





1. HTAP25 with a stockpile for 25% of the population  
2. HTAP50 with a stockpile for 50% of the population  
3. HTAP with an unlimited stockpile  
QALYs gained, total 
Expanded adjuvanted vaccination – 404 030 total QALYs gained  
Expanded antiviral prophylaxis – 282 329 total QALYs gained 
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4. School closure for 26 weeks  
5. Prevaccination 70% of the population with a low efficacy vaccine  
6. HTAP25 + school closure:  
7. HTAP50 + school closure:  
8. HTAP + school closure:  
9. Prevaccination + school closure: Prevaccinating 70% population with the low-
efficacy vaccine, plus closing all schools for 26 weeks 
10. Treatment only: Treating all cases with antivirals                                                       
11. FTAP25 for household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts, stockpile for 25% 
of the population                                                                                                                        
11. FTAP50 for household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts, stockpile for 
50% of population                                                                                                     
12. FTAP for household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts, stockpile 
unlimited                                                                                                                                    
14. FTAP25 + school closure  
13. 15. FTAP50 + school closure 
14. 16. FTAP + school closure 
Stockpiled strategy – 258 342 total QALYs gained  
No intervention - No QALYs gained 
 
QALYs per 1000 population, total 
All interventions gained a similar amount of QALYs, with some differences between 
them (21,141 for no intervention to 21 403 for prevaccination and school closure). 
Compared to FTAP not involving school closure, FTAP plus school closure or 
prevaccination plus school closure gains 51 QALYs 
 
QALYs per 1000 population, incremental 
FTAP and school closure and the intervention of prevaccination and school closure 
contributed to the most incremental QALYs (262) 
 
Deaths per 1000 population 
Pre-vaccination intervention was the most effective strategy. Only 1 death/1000 
population occurred via this strategy. 
On the other side, most deaths have been seen in case of no intervention (13 deaths/1000 
population) and FTAP25 with 12 deaths. 
 
Number of cases   
Full TAP is the most effective single strategy, reducing the number of cases by 54% 
Pre-vaccination reduces the number of cases by 48%  












Effectiveness in low-levels of interventions 
Vaccination is more effective than self-isolation. 
 
Effectiveness in high-levels of interventions 
Self-isolation is more effective than vaccination. This has been shown due to 









1. School closure as a sole intervention alone and as dual, triple, quadruple strategy 
 
2. Other social distancing strategies, such as reduced workplace attendance 
The illness attack rate of interventions (symptomatic)  
The illness attack rate ranges from 2.4% (SD 0.37) to 8.5% (SD 1.1) while that of the 
unmitigated attack rate is 13% (SD 0.9). 
The individual school closure for 2 weeks along with the continuous – 50% workplace 
closure, antiviral treatment, household antiviral prophylaxis and extended antiviral 
prophylaxis showed the lowest illness attack rate (2.4%). This combination is the most 
effective intervention. 
Short-duration school closure is less effective (6.5 to 8.2 illness attack rate) 
Continuous school closure is more effective, with an attack rate of 3.2. 
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Incidence rate reduction by the home confinement intervention 
There are studies that indicate the higher the compliance rate regarding home 
confinement, the higher the reduction of the incidence rate of influenza will be. More 
particularly: 
In case of a 70% compliance rate: 83% reduction of incidence rate 
In the case of 80% compliance rate: 91% reduction of incidence rate 
 
The compliance rate with home confinement is between 75.90 and 94.44%, for this 
study. 
 
Rate reduction threshold in the incidence due to intervention 
The higher the proportion of all cases complying with home confinement, the higher 
the reduction rate of the threshold for VSL will be.  
For example: In case of 49.24% of all cases complying with home confinement: €7.65 
million Threshold for VSL  
In case of 51.39% of all cases complying with home confinement: €5.06 million 
Threshold for VSL  
 
Trach
t t al. 
2012 







When there are no interventions (no masks worn) 
Cumulative number of cases/ based on three scenarios - R avg/unc* 
In the case of 1.25; A total of 101,424,384 cases. Most of them identified at 18-64 age 
group. 
In the case of 1.3; A total of 117 673 024 cases. Most of them identified at 18-64 age 
group. 




Based on three different scenarios - R avg/unc: 1.25, 1.3, and 1.35 
In the case of 1.25: For all age groups, a total of 3 275 616 hospitalizations have been 
estimated. 75.8% of them found to be in 18-64 ages 
 
In the case of 1.3: For all age groups, a total of 3 793 350 hospitalizations have been 
estimated. 74.8% of them found to be in 18-64 ages 
 
In the case of 1.35: For all age groups, a total of 4 184 352 hospitalizations have been 
estimated. 73.7% of them found to be in 18-64 ages 
 
Deaths 
More deaths have been found in ages 18-64, both in three scenarios, and more than 
90% of the total deaths (281 319-349 578) 
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As a result, the model showed that in case of 10% of the population wearing masks 
with an effectiveness of 20% in reducing susceptibility and infectivity, there is a large 
reduction in the cumulative number of cases. 
 
PCP: Primary care physician, YLL: Yearls of life lost, VSL: Value of statistical life, QALY: Quality-adjusted life year, FTAP: Full-targeted antiviral prophylaxis, SD: Standard deviation,  
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